

Rotating Substitution Cipher

- Rotates the mapping every letter
 - Hides simple statistical properties of plaintext:
 - Frequency analysis defeated: E encrypts to different letters
 - Repeated letter will not encrypt the same way in different positions


JILL WWII Crypto Spring 2006 - Class 3: Enigmatic Enigma


Rotating Substitution Weaknesses


- Will repeat after 26 letters
 - If there is a lot of ciphertext, can still do frequency analysis on every 26th letter slides
- Some properties revealed
 - If we see repeated letters in ciphertext, what does it mean?

JILL ⇒ HHNF


JILL WWII Crypto Spring 2006 - Class 3: Enigmatic Enigma















Settings

- Plugboard: swap pairs of letters
 - Number of plugs varied (≤ 6 until 1939, up to 10 after)
- Rotors
 - Before 1939 Three rotors (choose order)
 - After Choose 3 from set of 5 rotors
 - Orientations (3) start orientations of the 3 rotors
 - Ring settings (2) when next ring advances
- Reflector
 - Fixed symmetric substitution $(A \rightarrow B \Rightarrow B \rightarrow A)$ Involution: if we do it twice, get original back

JILL WWII Crypto Spring 2006 - Class 3: Enigmatic Enigma

13





Three Rotor Wheels



ILL WWII Crypto Spring 2006 - Class 3: Enigmatic Enigma

Enigma Schematic every letter Plaintext-R В Ciphertext Rotor Rotor Rotor Reflector Plugboard * 1 2 3 Ciphertext = $B^{-1}L^{-1}M^{-1}N^{-1}RNMLB(Plaintext)$ JILL WWII Crypto Spring 2006 - Class 3: Enigmatic Enigma





Reducing Key Space

Plugboard with 6 plugs $\approx 10^{11}$

Rotors: $(26!)^3 \approx 4 * 10^{26}$ Ring settings: $26^2 = 676$ Message Key: $26^3 = 17576$

Reflector: ≈ 8 * 10¹²





JILL WWII Crypto Spring 2006 - Class 3: Enigmatic Enigma


Capture a Machine

"This fictional movie about a fictional U.S. submarine mission is followed by a mention in the end credits of those actual British missions. Oh, the British deciphered the Enigma code, too. Come to think of it, they pretty much did everything in real life that the Americans do in this movie."

Roger Ebert's review of **U-571**


ILL WWII Crypto Spring 2006 - Class 3: Enigmatic Enigma


-







| Key Space | Plugboard with 6 plugs: $(26*25/2)*...**(16*15/2)/6!=10^{11}$ | Rotors: $(26!)^3 \approx 4*10^26 \text{ C } 3=$ | Ring settings: $26^2=676^0$ | Message Key: $26^3=17576$ | Reflector: (26*25/2)*(24*23/2) | $*...**(2*2)/13!**\approx 8*10^{12}1$ | Total: $\approx 7*10^{19}$ | $(>26^4$, still too big for exhaustive search









Batons Attack


• We know Z is:


ILL WWII Crypto Spring 2006 - Class 3: Enigmatic Enigma

- Function: contradiction if $Z(x) \neq Z(x)$
- Involution: contradiction if $Z(x) = y \& Z(y) \neq x$
- Find a rotor setting with no contradictions
 - Long enough crib, there will only be one
 - But if crib is too long, need to deal with R2 moving
- List of probable 4-10 letter words
- Catalog to map Z to rotor settings for R2 and R3

27

ILL WWII Crypto Spring 2006 - Class 3: Enigmatic Enigma





Operation

- Day key (distributed in code book)
- Each message begins with message key ("randomly" chosen by sender) encoded using day key
- Message key sent twice to check
- After receiving message key, reorient rotors according to key

JILL WWII Crypto Spring 2006 - Class 3: Enigmatic Enigma

Codebook Zoom

Repeated Message Key

$$\begin{split} P &= P_{1}P_{2}P_{3}P_{1}P_{2}P_{3} \\ C_{1} &= E_{1}\left(P_{1}\right) = B^{-1}\textbf{L}_{1}^{-1}M^{-1}N^{-1}RNM\textbf{L}_{1}B(P_{1}) \\ C_{4} &= E_{4}\left(P_{1}\right) = B^{-1}\textbf{L}_{4}^{-1}M^{-1}N^{-1}RNM\textbf{L}_{4}B(P_{1}) \\ \end{split}$$

$$\begin{aligned} P_{1} &= E_{1}\left(C_{1}\right) = B^{-1}\textbf{L}_{1}^{-1}M^{-1}N^{-1}RNM\textbf{L}_{1}B(C_{1}) \\ P_{1} &= E_{4}\left(C_{4}\right) = B^{-1}\textbf{L}_{4}^{-1}M^{-1}N^{-1}RNM\textbf{L}_{4}B(C_{4}) \\ \end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned} E_{4}OE_{1}\left(C_{1}\right) &= E_{4}\left(P_{1}\right) = C_{4} \\ E_{4}OE_{1} &= B^{-1}\textbf{L}_{1}^{-1}M^{-1}N^{-1}RNM\textbf{L}_{1}BB^{-1}\textbf{L}_{4}^{-1}M^{-1}N^{-1}RNM\textbf{L}_{4}B \\ &= B^{-1}\textbf{L}_{1}^{-1}M^{-1}N^{-1}RNM\textbf{L}_{1}AB^{-1}\textbf{L}_{4}^{-1}M^{-1}N^{-1}RNM\textbf{L}_{4}B \end{aligned}$$

JILL WWII Crypto Spring 2006 - Class 3: Enigmatic Enigma

Letter Permutations

Symmetry of Enigma:

if $E_{pos}(x) = y$ we know $E_{pos}(y) = x$

Given message openings

$$\mathbf{D}$$
MQ \mathbf{v} BM $\mathbf{E}_1(m_1) = \mathbf{D} \ \mathbf{E}_4(m_1) = \mathbf{V} \ \mathbf{E}_1 \mathbf{o} \mathbf{E}_4(\mathbf{D}) = \mathbf{V}$

$$\mathbf{von} \ \mathbf{p}_{UY} \qquad \Rightarrow \ \mathsf{E}_1(\mathsf{D}) = m_1$$

PUC FMQ
$$\Rightarrow$$
 E₄(E₁(D)) $=$ V

With enough message openings, we can build complete cycles for each position pair:

 $\mathsf{E}_1\mathsf{o}\mathsf{E}_4 = (\mathsf{DVPFKXGZYO}) \, (\mathsf{EIJMUNQLHT}) \, (\mathsf{BC}) \, (\mathsf{RW}) \, (\mathsf{A}) \, (\mathsf{S})$

Note: Cycles must come in pairs of equal length

IILL WWII Crypto Spring 2006 - Class 3: Enigmatic Enigma

Composing Involutions

- E_1 and E_2 are involutions $(x \rightarrow y \Rightarrow y \rightarrow x)$
- Without loss of generality, we can write:

$$E_1$$
 contains (a_1a_2) (a_3a_4) ... $(a_{2k-1}a_{2k})$ E_2 contains (a_2a_3) (a_4a_5) ... $(a_{2k}a_1)$

$$\begin{array}{ccc} & E_1 \\ a_1 \leftrightarrow & a_2 & & a_2 \leftarrow \end{array}$$

$$a_2 \leftrightarrow x = a_3$$
or $x = a_1$

$$a_3 \leftrightarrow a_4$$
 $a_4 \leftrightarrow x = a_5$ or $x = a_1$

Why can't x be a_2 or a_3 ?

JILL WWII Crypto Spring 2006 - Class 3: Enigmatic Enigma

34

Rejewski's Theorem

 E_1 contains (a_1a_2) (a_3a_4) ... $(a_{2k-1}a_{2k})$ E_4 contains (a_2a_3) (a_4a_5) ... $(a_{2k}a_1)$

 E_1E_4 contains $(a_1a_3a_5...a_{2k-1})$

$$(a_{2k}a_{2k-2}... a_4a_2)$$

- The composition of two involutions consists of pairs of cycles of the same length
- For cycles of length *n*, there are *n* possible factorizations

ILL WWII Crypto Spring 2006 - Class 3: Enigmatic Enigma

Factoring Permutations

 $E_1E_4 = (DVPFKXGZYO) (EIJMUNQLHT) (BC) (RW) (A) (S)$

$$(A)(S) = (AS) \circ (SA)$$

(BC)
$$(RW) = (BR)(CW) \circ (BW)(CR)$$

or = $(BW)(RC) \circ (WC) (BR)$

(DVPFKXGZYO) (EIJMUNQLHT)

JILL WWII Crypto Spring 2006 - Class 3: Enigmatic Enigma

How many factorizations?

(DVPFKXGZYO) (EIJMUNQLHT)

Once we guess a₂ everything else must follow! So, only n possible factorizations for an n-letter cycle

Total to try = 2 * 10 = 20

 E_2E_5 and E_3E_6 likely to have about 20 to try also

⇒ About 20³ (8000) factorizations to try (still too many in pre-computer days)

ILL WWII Crypto Spring 2006 - Class 3: Enigmatic Enigma

Luckily...

- Operators picked message keys ("cillies")
 - Identical letters
 - Easy to type (e.g., QWE)
- If we can guess $P_1 = P_2 = P_3$ (or known relationships) can reduce number of possible factorizations
- If we're lucky this leads to E₁ ...E₆

ILL WWII Crypto Spring 2006 - Class 3: Enigmatic Enigma

Solving?

$$\mathsf{E}_1 = \mathsf{B}^{-1}\mathsf{L}^{-1}\mathsf{Q}\,\mathsf{L}\mathsf{B}$$

$$E_2 = B^{-1}L^{-2}QL^2B$$

$$E_3 = B^{-1}L^{-3}QL^3B$$

$$E_4 = B^{-1}L^{-4}QL^4B$$

$$E_5 = B^{-1}L^{-5}QL^5B$$

 $E_6 = B^{-1}L^{-6}QL^6B$

6 equations, 3 unknowns

Not known to be efficiently solvable

ILL WWII Crypto Spring 2006 - Class 3: Enigmatic Enigma

Solving?

 $\mathsf{E}_1 = \mathsf{B}^{-1}\mathsf{L}^{-1}\mathsf{Q}\,\mathsf{L}\mathsf{B}$

Often, know plugboard settings $BE_1B^{-1} = L^{-1}QL$ (didn't change

frequently) 6 equations, 2 unknowns –

solvable

6 possible arrangements of 3 rotors, 263 starting locations

= 105,456 possibilities

Poles spent a year building a catalog of cycle structures covering all of them (until Nov 1937): 20 mins to break Then Germans changed reflector and they had to start

ILL WWII Crypto Spring 2006 - Class 3: Enigmatic Enigma

1939

- Early 1939 Germany changes scamblers and adds extra plugboard cables, stop double-transmissions
 - Poland unable to cryptanalyze
- 25 July 1939 Rejewski invites French and British cryptographers
 - Gives England replica Enigma machine constructed from plans, cryptanalysis
- 1 Sept 1939 Germany invades Poland, WWII starts

ILL WWII Crypto Spring 2006 - Class 3: Enigmatic Enigma

Alan Turing

- Leads British effort to crack Enigma
- Use cribs ("WETTER" transmitted every day at 6am) to find structure of plugboard settings
- 10,000 people worked at Bletchley Park on breaking Enigma (100,000 for Manhattan Project)



JILL WWII Crypto Spring 2006 - Class 3: Enigmatic Enigma

Alan Turing's "Bombe"



Steps through all possible rotor positions (26³), testing for probable plaintext; couldn't search all plugboard settings (> 10^{12}); take advantage of loops in cribs

JILL WWII Crypto Spring 2006 - Class 3: Enigmatic Enigma


42

"Bombes"

- Idea by Alan Turing
- Name from Rejewski's "Bomba" machine (Polish for bomb)
 - -"for lack of a better idea" (Rejewki's paper)
- Design by "Doc" Keen, British Tabulating Machine Co.
- First machine, "Victory": Bletchley Park, March 1940

ILL WWII Crypto Spring 2006 - Class 3: Enigmatic Enigma

44



IILL WWII Crypto Spring 2006 - Class 3: Enigmatic Enigma

Enigma Cryptanalysis

- Relied on combination of sheer brilliance, mathematics, espionage, operator errors, and hard work
- Huge impact on WWII
 - Britain knew where German U-boats were
 - Advance notice of bombing raids
 - But...keeping code break secret more important than short-term uses or giving credit: Turing's Enigma report declassified in 1996!

JILL WWII Crypto Spring 2006 - Class 3: Enigmatic Enigma

46

Turing after the War

- Made several major contributions to Computer Science (both before and after)
 - Most important award is named "Turing Award"
- Prosecuted for homosexuality
 - Illegal in Britain
 - Forced hormone treatment
- 1954 died of cyanide poisoning from eating apple (believed to be suicide)

IILL WWII Crypto Spring 2006 - Class 3: Enigmatic Enigma

47

Next Class: Modern Crypto

- Strong Symmetric Ciphers
 - How they are similar and different
 - How hard to break
- How two people who have never met can communicate securely
 - Public-key Cryptography
- What it means when you see the key symbol on your web browser

JILL WWII Crypto Spring 2006 - Class 3: Enigmatic Enigma