

CS588:  
Cryptology – Principles and Applications

## Lecture 1: Introduction

*With a magnetic card and his dog Buddy's name as a password, President Clinton e-signed a bill Friday that will make electronic signatures as real as those on paper.*

FoxNews, 30 June 2000



CS588: Cryptology  
University of Virginia  
Computer Science

David Evans  
<http://www.cs.virginia.edu/~evans>

## Menu

- Course Introduction
  - Why you should or shouldn't take this course
  - Course Logistics: details on Syllabus
- Introduction to Cryptology
  - Terminology
  - A simple substitution cipher
  - Brief history of 4000 years of Cryptology

**Send registration email by noon Friday.**

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## Resources

- David Evans (call me "Dave"), [devans@virginia.edu](mailto:devans@virginia.edu)  
Office Hours (236A):  
Tuesdays, 10:30-11:30am; Weds after class  
Research: code safety, static analysis, programming and reasoning about swarms
- TAs:  
Danny Loffredo, [dgl4b@virginia.edu](mailto:dgl4b@virginia.edu)  
CS Reading Room: Tuesdays, 3:30-4:30  
Anthony Wood, [adw5p@virginia.edu](mailto:adw5p@virginia.edu)  
TBA
- Web: <http://www.cs.virginia.edu/cs588>

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## Why you should take this course?

### Reason #1: Fate of Humanity

***Cryptology plays a central role in human history.***

***More than anything else, survival of humanity depends on computer security.***

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## Why you should take this course? Reason #2: Intellectual

***Cryptology is about making and solving puzzles.***

Purest form of intellectual endeavor.


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## Why you should take this course? Reason #3: Be like Tom

***Mr. Jefferson would have wanted you to.***



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## Bad reasons to take this class

- You want to write the ultimate destructive virus.
- You want to break into (UVA's | the CIA's | your bank's) computer systems.

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## How to get an A in CS551

Problem Sets (**40-50%**)

4 throughout term (1<sup>st</sup> is due 10 Sept)

Project (**30-50%**)

Teams of 1 – 4

Can involve design/implementation

Can involve survey/analysis

Exams (**30-50%**)

Midterm, Final

Class Contribution (**0-10%**)

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## “Easy ways” to get an A in CS551

- Break into my grades file (**on my home computer**) and change your grade to “Haha”
  - Physical attacks on my house, car or office are NOT eligible! (And NOT encouraged!)
  - Don’t try to break into UVA’s grade records:
    - Too easy (probably only worth a B, or C- for social engineering attack)
    - Honor code violation
- Discover a security flaw important enough to get reported in the New York Times
- Factor RSA-300 =

2769315567803442139028689061647233092237608363983953254005036722809375824714  
9473946190060218756255124317186573105075074546238828817121274630072161346956  
4396741836389979086904304472476001839015983033451909174663464663867829125664  
459895575157178816900228792711267471958357574416714366499722090015674047

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## Bonus Points / Demerits

(100 points = 1 problem set)

- +100 Posting in RISKS
- +(varies) Solving a challenge problem
- 100 Send me a virus
- 200 Get arrested for computer attack
- 1000 Get convicted for computer attack
- 100000 I get arrested for something you do

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## Challenge Problems

- Open until solved or last day of class
- Usually only first satisfactory answer gets bonus
  - Better, later answer might still get bonus
- Solve in groups, each member gets  $\sqrt{n} / n$  \* value (e.g., 2 people =  $\sqrt{2} / 2 = 0.7$ )

First challenge problem starts tomorrow:  
Jefferson wheel cryptogram (see course web page)

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## Decrypting the Honor Code

- **Learn from your fellow students – they are your best resource!**
- Write down who you discussed assignments with, all external sources you used
- Don’t use answers from last year’s class
- **Be honest – you know what cheating is and isn’t**
- Don’t “pledge” your assignments, but let me know if you plan to cheat

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## Logistics Questions?

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## What is cryptology?

- Greek: “krypto” = hide
- Cryptology – science of hiding  
= cryptography + cryptanalysis + steganography
- Cryptography – secret writing
- Cryptanalysis – analyzing (breaking) secrets  
*Cryptanalysis* is what attacker does  
*Decipher or Decryption* is what legitimate receiver does
- Kryptonite – breaking ciphers all night?

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## Cryptology and Security

Cryptology is a branch of *mathematics*.


Security is about *people*.

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## Terminology



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## Kerckhoff's Principle


- Cryptography **always** involves:
    - Transformation
    - Secret
  - **Security should depend only on the key**
  - Don't assume enemy won't know algorithm
    - Can capture machines, disassemble programs, etc.
    - Too expensive to invent new algorithm if it might have been compromised
  - Security through obscurity isn't
    - Look at history of examples
    - Better to have scrutiny by open experts
- "The enemy knows the system being used."  
Claude Shannon

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## Alice and Bob



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## Substitution Cipher

- $C = E_K(p)$   
 $C_i = K[p_i]$
- Key is alphabet mapping:  
 $a \rightarrow J, b \rightarrow L, \dots$
- Suppose attacker knows algorithm but not key, how many keys to try?  $26!$   
If every person on earth tried one per second, it would take 5B years.

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## Monoalphabetic Cipher

"XBW HGQW XS ACFPSUWG FWPGWXF  
CF AWWKZV CDQGJCDWA CD BHYJD  
DJXHGW; WUWD XBW ZWJFX  
PHGCSHF YCDA CF GSHFWA LV XBW  
KGSYCFW SI FBJGCDQ RDSOZWAQW  
OCXBBWZA IGSY SXBWGF. "

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## Frequency Analysis

"XBW HGQW XS ACFPSUWG FWPGWXF CF  
AWWKZV CDQGJCDWA CD BHYJD DJXHGW;  
WUWD XBW ZWJFX PHGCSHF YCDA CF  
GSHFWA LV XBW KGSYCFW SI FBJGCDQ  
RDSOZWAQW OCXBBWZA IGSY SXBWGF."

W: 20            "Normal" English:  
C: 11            e    12%  
F: 11            t    9%  
G: 11            a    8%

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## Pattern Analysis

"**XBe** HGQe XS ACFPSUeG FePGeXF CF  
AeeKZV CDQGJCDeA CD BHYJD DJXHGe;  
eUeD **XBe** ZeJFX PHGCSHF YCDA CF  
GSHFeA LV **XBe** KGSYCFe SI FBJGCDQ  
RDSOZeAqe OCXBBeZA IGSY SXBeGF."

XBe = "the"

Most common trigrams in English:

the = 6.4%

and = 3.4%

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## Guessing

"the HGQe **tS** ACFPSUeG FePGetF CF  
AeeKZV CDQGJCDeA CD hHYJD DJtHGe;  
eUeD the ZeJFt PHGCSHF YCDA CF  
GSHFeA LV the KGSYCFe SI FhJGCDQ  
RDSOZeAqe OChheZA IGSY StheGF."

S = "o"

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## Guessing

"the HGQe to ACFPoUeG FePGetF CF  
AeeKZV CDQGJCDeA CD hHYJD DJtHGe;  
eUeD the ZeJFt PHGCoHF YCDA CF  
GoHFeA LV the KGoYCFe oI FhJGCDQ  
RDo0ZeAqe OChheZA IGoY otheGF."

otheGF = "others"

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## Guessing

“the HrQe to ACsPoUer sePrets Cs  
AeeKZV CDQrJCDeA CD hHYJD DJtHre;  
eUeD the ZeJst PHrCoHs YCDA Cs  
roHseA LV the KroYCse oI shJrCDQ  
RDo0ZeAQe 0CthheZA IroY others.”

“sePrets” = “secrets”

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## Guessing

“the HrQe to ACscoUer secrets Cs  
AeeKZV CDQrJCDeA CD hHYJD DJtHre;  
eUeD the ZeJst cHrCoHs YCDA Cs  
roHseA LV the KroYCse oI shJrCDQ  
RDo0ZeAQe 0CthheZA IroY others.”

“ACscoUer” = “discover”

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## Guessing

“the HrQe to discover secrets is  
deeKZV iDQrJiDed iD hHYJD DJtHre;  
eveD the ZeJst cHrioHs YiDd is  
roHsed LV the KroYise oI shJriDQ  
RDo0ZedQe Oi thheZd IroY others.”

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## Monoalphabetic Cipher

“The urge to discover secrets is deeply  
ingrained in human nature; even the  
least curious mind is roused by the  
promise of sharing knowledge withheld  
from others.”

- John Chadwick,

*The Decipherment of Linear B*

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## Why was it so easy?

- Doesn't hide statistical properties of plaintext
- Doesn't hide relationships in plaintext (EE cannot match dg)
- English (and all natural languages) are very redundant: about 1.3 bits of information per letter
  - Compress English with gzip – about 1:6

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## How to make it harder?

- Cosmetic
  - Encrypt "e" with 12 different symbols, "t" with 9 different symbols, etc.
  - Add nulls, remove spaces
- Polyalphabetic cipher
  - Use different substitutions
- Transposition
  - Scramble order of letters

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## Types of Attacks


- Ciphertext-only - How much Ciphertext?
- Known Plaintext - often "Guessed Plaintext"
- Chosen Plaintext (get ciphertext)
  - Not as uncommon as it sounds!
- ~~Chosen Ciphertext (get plaintext)~~
- Dumpster Diving Not recommended in CS588
- Social Engineering
- "Rubber-hose cryptanalysis"
  - Cryptanalyst uses threats, blackmail, torture, bribery to get the key.

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## Really Brief History First 4000 years




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- ### Themes
- Arms race between cryptographers and cryptanalysts
    - But, often disconnect between two (e.g., Mary Queen of Scots uses monoalphabetic cipher long after known breakable)
  - Motivated by war (more recently: commerce)
  - Driven by advances in technology, mathematics
  - Multi-disciplinary field
    - Linguists, classicists, mathematicians, computer scientists, physicists
  - Secrecy often means advances rediscovered and miscredited
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- ### Security vs. Pragmatics
- Trade-off between security and effort
    - one-time pad: perfect security, but requires distribution and secrecy of long key
    - DES: short key, fast algorithm, but breakable
    - quantum cryptography: perfect security, guaranteed secrecy of key, slow, requires expensive hardware
  - Don't spend \$10M to protect \$1M.
  - Don't protect \$1B with encryption that can be broken for \$1M.
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- ### Perfectly Secure Cipher: One-Time Pad
- Mauborgne/Vernam [1917]
  - XOR ( $\oplus$ ):
    - $0 \oplus 0 = 0$     $1 \oplus 0 = 1$
    - $0 \oplus 1 = 1$     $1 \oplus 1 = 0$
    - $a \oplus a = 0$
    - $a \oplus 0 = a$
    - $a \oplus b \oplus b = a$
  - $E(P, K) = P \oplus K$   
 $D(C, K) = C \oplus K = (P \oplus K) \oplus K = P$
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## Why perfectly secure?

- For any given ciphertext, all plaintexts are equally possible.

Ciphertext: **0100111110101**

Key1: 1100000100110

Plaintext1: 1000111010011 = "CS"

Key2: 1100010100110

Plaintext2: 1000101010011 = "BS"

- More formal proof next time

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## Go to the beach?

- Cannot reuse K
  - What if receiver has
$$C_1 = P_1 \oplus K \text{ and } C_2 = P_2 \oplus K$$
$$C_1 \oplus C_2 = P_1 \oplus K \oplus P_2 \oplus K$$
$$= P_1 \oplus P_2$$
- Need to generate truly random bit sequence as long as all messages
- Need to securely distribute key

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## "One-Time" Pad's in Practice

- Lorenz Machine –
  - Nazi high command in WWII
  - Pad generated by 12 rotors
  - Receiver and sender set up rotors in same positions
  - One operator retransmitted a message (but abbreviated message header the second time!)
  - Enough for Bletchley Park to figure out key – and structure of machine that generated it!
  - But still had to try all configurations



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## Colossus – First Programmable Computer

- Bletchley Park, 1944
- Read ciphertext and Lorenz wheel patterns from tapes
- Tried each alignment, calculated correlation with German
- Decoded messages (63M letters by 10 Colossus machines) that enabled Allies to know German troop locations to plan D-Day
- Destroyed in 1960, kept secret until 1970s



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## Charge

- **Send me your registration survey by noon tomorrow**
- Start thinking about projects and teams
- Subscribe to comp.risks and Cryptogram (instructions on manifest)
- Next time:
  - Proving Ciphers are Perfect (in Theory)
  - Information Theory